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Through both the pre and post-war periods of Japan’s 
history, industrial capacity was intimately linked with the 
country’s national interest and identity.  One integral component 
of that industrial capacity was Japan’s automotive industry.  The 
cars produced by the major Japanese automakers—Honda, 
Toyota, and Nissan—are today as ubiquitous as ever.  However, 
the industry behind the disproportionate amount of cars 
imported from a tiny island nation in East Asia informs a 
broader narrative of US-Japan relations.  The story of the rapid 
rise of Japan’s automotive production demonstrates that 
economic attitudes among producers, rather than government 
planning, take precedence.  How the major Japanese car brands 
crafted an industrial strategy to compete with and outpace 





engineering as it is in smart investments, trade, and management 
practices. 
In this paper I will argue that the story of Japanese 
automotive dominance is only partly explained by Chalmers 
Johnson’s theory of the “developmental state” and a robust 
industrial policy.   Rather, Japan’s bid for control of the global 
auto market was supported primarily by the keiretsu business 
structure which was designed to thwart foreign competition, 
especially from the United States, by keeping costs low and 
supply chains guarded.  Moreover, I will explain the ineffective 
measures undertaken by the United States to combat the keiretsu 
in the 1995 Auto Dispute, demonstrating the failure of 
American economic policy to outcompete coordinated firm 
planning in Japan. The evolution of the shaky US-Japan 
 




Today, Japan’s auto industry is renowned for its dominance of foreign markets.  Japanese cars are cheap and fuel-efficient, 
undercutting larger, more expensive automobiles from Europe and America.  Scholarship on recent Japanese industrial development 
tends to prioritize a ‘developmental state’ and robust industrial policy in shielding Japanese manufacturers from trade liberalization.  
This paper will argue that, while the industrial policy steered by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) played a 
significant role in advancing the interests of the Japanese auto industry, it was ultimately the unique trust-based keiretsu 
conglomerate structure that gave Japanese auto producers a comparative advantage vis-à-vis their American counterparts.  Cost 
reduction on the firm level allowed major Japanese automotive companies to skirt free trade measures, simultaneously insulating 
their business model from the American led trend towards globalization and trouncing the American automakers, for whom union 
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economic alliance throughout the post-war period, with a focus 
on the automotive industry, will reveal how Japan “won” the 
globalized auto trade during the 1990s and beyond, establishing 
themselves as the premier exporters to the United States of 
cheap, fuel efficient cars in the 21st century. 
The rapid expansion of the Japanese auto industry in 
the post-war period challenged American automakers on two 
fronts: design and cost.  Japanese cars were smaller and cheaper, 
designed better for the fuel-conscious urban consumers who 
began to make up a larger and larger share of the American 
market.  Furthermore, the 1973 oil crisis sparked a general 
market trend which favored smaller, affordable cars, and 
American autos were large and fuel-inefficient, making them 
less attractive than their Japanese counterparts.   But Japan was 
not only in the business of making the right car at the right time.  
The unique style of Japanese industrial organization—
keiretsu—aimed at keeping prices down for Japanese producers 
while leveraging foreign markets as much as possible.  
Ultimately, it was these keiretsus that proved to be the 
determining force in the auto trade between the United States 
and Japan. 
 
CHALMERS JOHNSON AND THE 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
In his book MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Chalmers 
Johnson argues that the key to Japan’s economic success lay in 
a strong industrial policy guided by state authority.  MITI, the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, steered and 
coordinated the Japanese economy out of its post-war malaise.  
The policies it supported were guided by an economically 
nationalist creed; Johnson writes that MITI “is convinced that 
market forces alone will never produce the desired shifts … of 
energy and resources into new industries and economic 
activities.”   Under this broad philosophy, MITI policy 
organized Japanese industry through patent regulation, trade 
barriers, and technology transfer restrictions.  All of these 
policies can be labeled under the banner of “industrial policy,” 
a phenomenon that economist Robert B. Reich has described 
as a policy that “focuses on the most productive pattern of 
investment, and thus it favors business segments that promise 
to be strong international competitors while helping to develop 
the industrial infrastructure (highways, ports, sewers) and 
skilled work force needed to support those segments.”   MITI, 
according to Johnson, was merely the next stage of evolution 
for Japan’s prewar controlled economy.  While Japanese 
government ministries before and during the war mobilized 
domestic industry to produce defense technology and wartime 
materiel, the post-war attitude focused on dominance in the 
expanding semiconductor and auto industries.  Like before, 
Japan endeavored to use targeted industrial policy to decouple 
its economic power from constraints on its geography and 
natural resources. Unlike before, the main exponent of 
Japanese industrial policy—MITI—would harness and redirect 
globalization and trade liberalization rather than aim at pure 
autarky.  
Thus, Johnson seeks to prove that there exist sizable 
“differences between the course of development of a particular 
industry without government policies … and its course of 
development with the aid of governmental policies.”   Johnson's 
thesis may not be wrong—industrial policy certainly 
contributed to the global ascent of Japanese industry in the latter 
half of the 20th century.  However, his framing of Japanese 
industrial policies ignores some of the key non-governmental 
factors—like the infamous keiretsu structure, which 
exacerbated trade tensions between the United States and Japan 
by protecting the auto industry.  In light of the oil crisis, low 
prices appear to have been the central ingredient of successful 
carmaking, and keiretsus allowed for major automakers with 
extensive supplier networks to slash production costs through 
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lower wages and higher quantity production.   An analysis of the 
late history of the auto industry in Japan will, I hope, augment 
Johnson’s thesis and explain why internal microeconomic 
aspects of firm organization 
ultimately guided the success of 
the Japanese auto industry.  As we 
will see, even the neoliberal 
agenda of President Clinton proved 
insufficient in breaking the backs 




STRATEGY IN THE 
POST-WAR PERIOD 
Prior to World War II, 
Japanese industrial capacity was 
packaged into zaibatsu—
monopolistic and oftentimes 
dynastic corporate entities which 
controlled entire industries.  The 
zaibatsu organized themselves around “holding companies, 
interlocking directorships, and mutual stockholdings,” as well 
as “Extremely large financial power in the form of commercial 
bank credit.”   This organizational structure likely gave Japan an 
advantage in wartime, as their industrial capacity was retooled 
for military hardware and industry entered an autarkic phase.  
Moreover, the enmeshed zaibatsu acted as their own support 
system, with each of the three major zaibatsu families—
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui, and Yasuda—owning a 
significant percentage of the banks of the other zaibatsu.   In the 
aftermath of the war, the zaibatsu drew the ire of American 
bureaucrats and military officials like Major General William 
Marquat, who broke up the zaibatsu in order to achieve 
“economic deconcentration,” a policy which aimed at 
preventing Japan from being able to leverage a deep industrial 
base to pursue future military objectives.   The initial American 
antagonism towards Japan’s 
proprietary style of industrial 
organization would persist, just like 
the overall organization of the zaibatsu 
themselves.  SCAP policy, although 
successful in eliminating much of the 
crony dynasticism of the major 
zaibatsu, did not rid the Japanese 
economy of the structural blueprint 
created by the zaibatsu.  Rather than 
disappear, the basic groupings of 
companies beneath umbrella holding 
companies that characterized the 
prewar zaibatsu survived into the 
postwar period, with each of the major 
Japanese automotive companies 
retaining the linkages of its respective 
zaibatsu network.  
In fact, the zaibatsu groupings 
remained largely intact, renewed by 
re-investment in the same type of interlocking stockholding 
arrangements which connected the prewar monopolies, albeit 
without the aegis of a large bank to provide liquidity to the 
affiliate zaibatsu companies.   The keiretsu which emerged in 
the aftermath of the American occupation bore many of the 
same features of their zaibatsu predecessors.  They were 
networks of similar firms linked by similar interests in keeping 
the prices of auto parts down and keeping exports boosted.  The 
Japanese auto industry, once woven into the zaibatsu system, 
was in the postwar period organized into vertical keiretsus.   
These arrangements aimed at controlling the supply chain of 
manufacturing for a given good—automobiles in this case—in 
order to internalize input costs and achieve a close level of 
 
“The unique style of 
Japanese industrial 
organization—keiretsu—
aimed at keeping prices 
down for Japanese 
producers while leveraging 
foreign markets as much as 
possible.  Ultimately, it was 
these keiretsus that proved 
to be the determining force 
in the auto trade between 
the United States and 
Japan.” 
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cooperation which could outcompete foreign automakers.   As 
opposed to the prewar zaibatsus, the keiretsus were not 
organized centrally by a family-owned banking trust.  Rather, 
they were vertically or horizontally integrated supply chains 
which fostered close cooperation between keiretsu members in 
order to cut costs and reduce competition for inputs in order to 
strategize years into the future.  Gone was the characteristic 
zaibatsu family structure, which was viewed by General 
MacArthur’s economic advisors as an autarkic obstacle to a 
democratic Japanese political economy.   
In the post-war keiretsus, the linkages between a 
primary auto manufacturing firm, like Toyota, Honda, or 
Nissan, and their subsidiary auto parts and affiliate firms were 
governed primarily by a mutual goal of maximizing economic 
production.  In the automotive industry, cost reduction on a per-
firm basis of even the smallest percentage can yield large 
savings and higher profitability when extrapolated to the entire 
industry.  Moreover, in the resource intensive car industry, the 
central nodes of the keiretsus—the automakers themselves—
could dominate the network, demanding cost cutting from their 
affiliates in return for the promise of greater bulk orders and 
business aid to the smaller firms.   The stability of this keiretsu 
system in the automotive industry “increases the self-
sufficiency of the keiretsu and promotes long-term cooperation 
through mutual sustenance.”   The mutual dependencies created 
by the keiretsu networks among Japanese automakers and part 
suppliers allowed for a unique bargaining environment which 
gave Japan an advantage over the auto industry in the United 
States: cheaper car production. 
 
KEIRETSU ORGANIZATION: A FIRM 
LEVEL VIEW 
The strength of the keiretsus lay in the advantages they 
conferred to their members.  In many ways, the keiretsu was a 
distinctly Japanese phenomenon—the culmination of a tradition 
of Japanese industrial discipline and strategy begun in the Meiji 
Restoration. 
From the view of an American firm, each of the major 
Japanese automakers—Honda, Toyota, Nissan, and 
Mitsubishi—maintained their own keiretsu.  With the exception 
of Mitsubishi, which can be classified as a horizontal keiretsu 
due to its involvement in multiple industries in addition to auto 
manufacturing, the auto conglomerates each organized their 
own, distinct supply chains.  This system reduced competition 
between automakers and siloed production via interlocking 
shareholding agreements and long term contracts between 
suppliers and automakers.  To an extent, the auto industry in 
Japan was anti-competitive vis-à-vis foreign firms.  However, 
Japanese automakers, aided by MITI’s protectionist policy still 
competed against one another on the issue of engineering and 
design to capture the global market.  The industry was not a 
cartel, so much as it was a highly coordinated oligopoly.  
Without the influence of MITI, the automobile industry in Japan 
could not have enjoyed such high levels of success abroad.  
Without the keiretsus, they could not have sustained growth and 
production on the global scale. 
Keiretsus were bonded together by creating economies 
of scale for all members of the conglomerate and by reducing 
production costs for those members.  One of the largest sources 
of cost-reduction for the large producer firms was in wages—in 
1960, wages at smaller subcontracting firms were 60% of the 
larger firms which they supplied.   Low wages were reinforced 
by the Japanese tradition of lifetime employment, which made 
suppliers reluctant to hiring new employees, instead waiting to 
phase out a generation of workers.  Keeping labor entrenched in 
the keiretsu system resulted in cost savings on all levels.   These 
features made the relationship particularly advantageous to a 
company like Toyota or Nissan, for whom lower domestic input 
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costs increased competitiveness on the international market.  
Moreover, smaller firms were rewarded for their willingness to 
supply inputs at a lower cost with larger purchase orders.  The 
inter-firm relationships established in the keiretsu structure 
limited the flexibility of smaller firms and enhanced the 
profitability of larger firms. 
Why did American firms not emulate their Japanese 
competitors?  The reason is primarily cultural: Japanese 
automakers maintained a high degree of trust with their supplier 
firms, while American automakers kept suppliers at arms-
length.   Interlocking shareholding agreements and consulting 
and business assistance followed purchase orders.  On average, 
Japanese automaker-supplier relationships had endured for an 
average of more than 40 years by the turn of the 21st century.   
Established, institutional trust was a hallmark concept of the 
Japanese keiretsus, and one which was completely foreign to 
American automakers.  The story of the keiretsu, therefore, is a 
story of American industrial sclerosis and Japanese industrial 
innovation. 
 
ADVANTAGES OF KEIRETSU 
MEMBERSHIP 
Keiretsu membership was an appealing proposition for 
member firms for many reasons, but the most important were 
the following: the potential for a robust supplier-producer 
relationship in which suppliers oftentimes advised or invested 
in their supplier affiliates, and the economic protection offered 
by a larger firm with production capacity around the globe. 
At Toyota, keiretsu negotiations between auto 
executives and suppliers were conducted in large conference 
rooms known as obeyas.   The primary function of these rooms 
was to facilitate cooperation and information sharing between 
all sectors—supply, design, engineering, and finance—integral 
to the automotive development process. These types of 
meetings, in which suppliers were directly involved in the 
design process, were a unique feature of Toyota’s corporate 
style.  They allowed the affiliate firms of Toyota’s keiretsu to 
participate directly in product-development meetings, thus 
expediting the time it would take to design and produce a car 
and fostering closer interpersonal relationships between 
producer and supplier.  As is apparent from the name, the obeya 
were an explicitly Japanese phenomenon, originating from the 
Toyota Motor Corporation.  While American firms would later 
adapt to the Japanese style of auto manufacturing, the obeya 
strengthened the keiretsus and simplified Toyota’s car 
development timeline.   And obeyas were not an isolated aspect 
of the keiretsu system.  Rather, they were part and parcel of a 
broader network effect of the keiretsus that allowed the member 
firms to outcompete their foreign competitors by making 
cheaper cars in higher volumes, leveraging close, trust-built 
relationships to streamline production. 
Automotive keiretsus were also bonded together by a 
system of “mutual sustenance” that ensured that the business 
success of the central carmaker would trickle down to the parts 
suppliers.  Honda would routinely offer advice and business 
support to its suppliers, helping improve their profitability and 
in turn securing the relationship for Honda’s future production 
needs.   This facet of the keiretsu structure was grounded upon 
the principle that investing in the member firms would translate 
to long term growth investment in the larger automakers.  Rather 
than laid out in a contract, the resulting relationship which 
developed between the affiliates and their keiretsu partners was 
one “based on trust, cooperation, and educational support for 
suppliers.”   The stability which this model afforded to all 
participants far outweighed the potential downsides of such 
coordination, allowing all firms to engage in economies of scale 
in a less competitive business environment. 
Overall, the keiretsu corporate structure gave the 
Japanese auto industry the microeconomic flexibility to make 
5
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larger investments in international growth.  Within the keiretsus, 
profit incentives for both automakers and their suppliers 
enjoyed a direct relationship.  In the United States, however, 
such buyer-seller networks simply did not exist.  On top of that, 
the trust-based relationships upon which the keiretsus operated 
also made outside suppliers and producers less appealing to 
keiretsu member firms, creating a sort of trade barrier 
independent of government intervention.   That trade barrier was 
strengthened as much by the guarantee of economies of scale as 
by a recognition that all Japanese firms would act cohesively.  
Keiretsu member firms with long term contracts to the central 
automaker would rather continue their bilateral relationship 
with that firm than sell to a foreign automaker, with whom they 
would not have had the advantage of a shared culture or national 
interest.  That exclusivity, and the commercial security it 
afforded, undoubtedly shaped the impenetrability of the 
keiretsus to American competitors.   While Japan’s keiretsus 
were at their height, foreign competitors could not leverage 
trust-based relationships with producers to keep prices down 
and make long term investments. Given the international 
circumstances of the 1973 oil crisis, the internal management of 
auto firms mattered substantially more on a basis of cost 
savings, far more than MITI’s capacity to restrict or subsidize 
trade and industry. 
. 
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO 
JAPANESE INCURSION 
The background of the keiretsu industrial structure in 
Japan provides ample contrast with the automotive industry in 
the United States.  While major Japanese auto manufacturers 
leveraged their industrial organization in order to cut costs, 
shield their domestic market from foreign competition, and 
flood the international marketplace with cheap cars, American 
automakers lacked the adaptability and flexibility to compete 
with an industry that was so internally coordinated.  Japanese 
trade representative Hidetoshi Ukawa stated in an interview that 
“we [the Japanese] can't dictate the size of our [auto] exports to 
the U.S. market. That depends on the American consumer.”   
This attitude towards the auto trade reflected in Japan an 
understanding mirrored by the keiretsu arrangements—that 
under the pressures of trade liberalization and globalization, 
cost-reduction and industrial coordination would yield 
marketplace dominance in the vital auto industry.  Cheaper 
production costs stemming from low wages met demand for 
cheaper cars, and Japan was able to make those cheaper cars, 
largely independent of MITI policy.   
American demand for Japanese cars was so high in the 
early 1980’s, that, in 1985, MITI announced the continuation of 
a Voluntary Restraint Agreement to limit the amount of auto 
exports Japan shipped to the United States.   The 1985 VRA had 
been in place several years prior and responded to the concerns 
of the US automakers, who believed Japan was becoming a 
hegemonic force in the automotive industry: between 1969 and 
1985 Japan increased its share of global car production from 
3.6% to 25.5%.   But instead of catching up to the Japanese 
industry, the Americans stagnated.  Economics reporter Hobart 
Rowen wrote in The Washington Post that, “the American 
industry did almost nothing to make itself competitive with 
producers of small Japanese cars. The VRA never was linked to 
specific investment decisions or wage concessions.”   In other 
words, the American automakers did little to recalibrate their 
investments in relation to Japanese market expansion. 
While the American auto industry continued to putter 
along, producing large, fuel inefficient cars, the Japanese built 
up their portfolio of factories in the United States, continuing to 
poach business even under the VRA.   By subverting the VRA 
and relocating a share of production to the U.S. mainland, the 
Japanese auto industry, independent of MITI’s direction, 
improved its condition.  The VRA merely served as a signal to 
redirect investment to cope with the pressures of trade 
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liberalization. And voluntary agreements could only go so far 
towards securing a future for US automakers—in the wake of 
the VRA, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and Mitsubishi all made 
investments in US plants and negotiated to supply US 
automakers with engine parts and in some cases even whole cars 
to fill the subcompact range.   The major Japanese firms also 
entered into “joint-venture” agreements with their American 
counterparts, agreeing to supply US automakers with parts, and 
in some cases even mass purchase orders for finished autos.  
American firms ultimately found it more profitable to enter 
contractual agreements with larger Japanese firms.   Japanese 
producers were simply better equipped with their keiretsu cost 
savings to dominate the global market for small cars.  Under the 
VRA, which was official MITI policy, the Japanese automakers 
adjusted short term investments in ways which would serve their 
long term export ambitions and corner American automakers on 
their home field.   
 On the American front, the development of 
auto manufacturing had been enjoying steady growth since the 
beginning of the postwar period.   That growth among the Big 
Three automakers—Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors—
however, was halted by the oil crisis, and between 1972 and 
1980 imports of cars, mostly from Japan, grew from 15 to 27 
percent.   In the preceding years, stability in the auto industry 
had handed the United Auto Workers a considerable amount of 
political power, forcing wages for auto workers up and thus 
squeezing the auto industry’s ability to respond to changing 
consumer demand.   Thus a void was opened and promptly filled 
by small Japanese cars.  Unlike in the United States, Japanese 
auto worker unions, like the Toyota Motor Workers Union, were 
more or less subservient to the corporation whose employees 
they represented.   This symbiotic relationship contrasted 
heavily with the large concessions demanded by UAW 
representatives of the Big Three.  A 1998 UAW led strike on 
General Motors contributed to a daily loss of $80 million 
dollars.   Such strikes were nonexistent in the factories of 
Japanese automakers, on the Japanese mainland or in the US, 
where the Japanese sought to avoid the management problem of 
unionization.   Therefore, the issue of unions, although isolated 
internally within the domestic politics of Japan and the US, had 
an external effect on the balance of trade between the two 
countries.  Overall, industrial organization and management-
level decision making can reflect massive differences in 
profitability and market share in the auto industry.  While the 
Japanese utilized keiretsus to cut costs and pursued a policy of 
non-unionization in the United States to keep wages down, 
American manufacturers could not match the pricing nor 
possessed the business flexibility to meet changing consumer 
demand. 
 
THE 1995 AUTO DISPUTE: KEIRETSUS 
IN DIPLOMACY 
The tensions from the era of the VRA continued into 
the 1990’s, proving that the auto trade surplus which Japan 
enjoyed with the United States was relatively immune to trade 
restrictions.  These tensions between the United States and 
Japan came to a fore in the 1995 auto dispute, in which President 
Clinton threatened to enact $6 billion in tariffs on luxury auto 
imports to the US from Japan in response to Japanese 
unwillingness to make room for American auto part imports in 
Japan.  The lesson of the dispute, and its recognition of the 
increasingly globalized supremacy of the Japanese auto 
industry, speaks to the potency of Japan’s keiretsus to delay and 
avoid trade liberalization. 
The dispute, which arose out of a complaint launched 
against Japan by the United States and the WTO, reflected 
American exasperation with Japan’s growing automotive 
power.  While Japanese companies continued to undercut 
American competitors by using the unique structure of the 
keiretsus to avert steep supply costs, this strategy also limited 
7
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the power of American companies to export to Japan.  This 
imbalance produced a Japanese auto parts market of which 
Americans made up 2.6%, and an American market of which 
the Japanese made up 32.5%.   Under the agreement, the 
American threat of sanctions brought the Japanese to concede 
non-specific import quotas. While the official terms of the 
agreement seemed to benefit both sides—Japan avoiding costly 
tariffs and the United States’ suppliers gaining a foothold in the 
seemingly impenetrable Japanese market, the lack of concrete 
steps to address the trade imbalance was flagrant.   For one, the 
keiretsus of the auto industry openly opposed the import quotas, 
as ceding a portion of their supplier network to foreign 
competition would undoubtedly hurt their bottom line.  As a 
result, there were no concrete quotas enacted under the 
agreement, as Japanese industry had the final say, thus exposing 
the discrepancy between the perceived power of MITI to put 
Japanese industries in line and the relative independence of the 
auto industry on matters of trade.   Americans recognized this 
issue, and the New York Times reported that “the issue [of the 
auto dispute] was considered critical to breaking the “keiretsu” 
system of suppliers, which [had] been blamed for many of the 
troubles American companies encounter in Japan.”   Just a few 
years before the dispute erupted, Japan’s trade surplus with the 
United States also became a point of contention for third party 
presidential candidate Ross Perot, who often remarked on the 
declining caliber of US auto manufacturing and the necessity of 
bolstering domestic production with industrial policy.   Overall, 
the trade dispute points to the fact that the CEOs of Japan’s 
automakers would eventually determine the success of the 
agreement, dictating to the American their adjustments to 
import buying, not vice-versa.   The survival of the profitable 
keiretsus, rather than MITI’s policy, once again seemed to 
directly affect Japan’s global automotive reach. 
 
CONCLUSION 
A Harvard Business School Report on the “new 
keiretsus” asserts that  “the essence of keiretsu has proved 
durable, and the ability to avoid the hidden costs of Western-
style supplier relationships is an important reason.”   The 
keiretsu structure has largely survived, despite the recent global 
movement towards market liberalization, led often by the 
United States.  The fact that keiretsus have seemed to be so 
impenetrable in the auto industry is largely a testament to their 
ability to coexist with, adapt to, and sometimes even determine 
the course of state policy and diplomatic agreements.  The 1985 
VRA extension and the 1995 auto dispute both allowed the auto 
industry to utilize their efficient keiretsu business structure to 
work around political conditions which were hostile to the 
growing Japanese trade surplus.  In each case, it was the keiretsu 
which offered the Japanese auto industry a competitive 
advantage, allowing them to cut costs and reshuffle investments 
to box out foreign competition.  It is this story then, in addition 
to the story that Chalmers Johnson tells in MITI and the 
Japanese Miracle, which explains the rapid ascent of Japanese 
auto manufacturing in the postwar era. 
. 
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